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How can memories of past experiences deﬁne so much who we are, or bound us to a
place, or cause eternal grief, or suddenly lose their grip on our lives and vanish in the
limbo of our past?
In ‘‘Vital memory and aﬀect,’’ Steven D Brown and Paula Reavey (2015) pro-
pose an original reconceptualization of memory that allows to account for what
they call ‘‘vital memories,’’ that is, ‘‘memory that are in some way fundamental to a
sense of who we are as persons’’ (p. xiii). They propose a model of memory as
located in the ﬂow of time and as complex conﬁguration of aﬀects, relationships,
images and material things, socioculturally situated. Because this model has much
to do with current attempts to account for complex modalities of experiencing from
a cultural psychological perspective, I wish to brieﬂy summarize that work, before
showing its possible prolongations.
A topological understanding of expanded memory
Brown and Reavey propose a thorough examination of what they call ‘‘restricted’’
approaches to memory – approaches that consider memory as something individ-
ual, intracranial, and that can be subjected to biases and forgetting. Instead, draw-
ing on James, Spinoza, Lewin as well as Serres and Gattari, they develop an
understanding of what they call an ‘‘expanded memory.’’ According to this view,
‘‘remembering is performed by a system, a functional mixture of people and things
in a particular material environment, rather than isolated individuals. Put more
blandly, remembering is a setting-speciﬁc operation’’ (p. 43). To ground this idea,
they propose to consider the life-spaces of remembering, in a topological sense.
Inspired by Lewin, they consider that the given life-space is made of everything that
counts in the constitution of the present experience of the person, ‘‘a space of
relations (. . .) with respect to the future signiﬁcance of our actions’’ (p. 51). An
implication of this is that speciﬁc settings enable or aﬀord diﬀerent types of remem-
bering. The interest of this conception in topological terms is that it invites us to
consider the property of an experience not in its details, but as constituted from its
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relations; these can be distorted and transformed, but some essential features make
us say that it is still ‘‘the same.’’
Such topological understanding of the life-space is then conceived as part of the
ﬂow of our consciousness; memories appear as elements that create ‘‘chreods’’ in
Serres’ terms, that is, that shape the very bed of the river in which we experience the
world. A memory is such, as long as it shapes the present – but may vanish if with
time the bed has been transformed, and does not guide the present or the future
anymore. Hence, following Bergson, the authors can also theorize forgetting, as
‘‘selective canalization of the past, such that only those aspects of our past that may
inform our current actions are retained at any given point’’ (p.71).
In addition, the authors draw on Spinoza both to highlight the aﬀective nature of
these memories and the way in which they can expand our capacity to experience the
world, and the ethical implications that follow. In eﬀect, according to them, Spinoza’s
core ethical principle is to maximize our endeavor to exist; and ‘‘the way to increasing
our powers is via the ordering of our relations with the world in such a way that
we maximize successful encounters and minimize unsuccessful encounters’’ (p. 79).
With these few principles highlighted, Brown and Reavey examine a series of
situations in which vital memories are experienced, challenged, created or con-
tained. Doing so, they show many implications of the basic grammar they propose.
In eﬀect, one of the dynamic they highlight is the ‘‘unfolding’’ of life-spaces: life-
spaces can expand from a speciﬁc setting, with their speciﬁc ‘‘arrangements’’ or
‘‘assemblages,’’ and open up in diﬀerent directions, touching many situations in the
past (or future or elsewhere) deeply connected as part of comparable assemblages.
In this unfolding, distal and past experiences are explored and they come to enrich
the present; these unfolding and expansion are triggered or aﬀorded by the topo-
logical properties of the setting. However, these unfolding can also be encouraged
or supported by the setting, or not recognized if not deliberately ignored, by indi-
vidual people, institutional agents, group dynamics and the media, or institutions.
Five case studies
These ideas are put to work in a series of case studies that can be read as variations
of the work of the various aspects just highlighted.
The ﬁrst example considered is that of adults who had been victims of abuse
during their childhood. Here, the authors show how speciﬁc arrangements consti-
tute or contain these vital memories. Hence, the memory of a former child sitting
on a wall helped by an adult to go down can contain a memory of abuse. These,
however, reread through time, can also evoke contradictory meanings – the pleas-
ure of the child being helped by an adult vs. the abusive touch of the adult doing so.
The vital memory is connected precisely to the tipping experience and the array of
contradictory feelings, mainly connected to the contradictory experience of being a
child with agency vs. being dependent to the adults’ will. The authors’ proposition
is that the invariant constitution of that situation (wall/adult/child) remains active
in the present and can awake this whole set of past experiences upon the present:
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any situation in which a child is on a height and helped by an adult can become a
trigger to unfold these layers of experience. However, the same place or space can
also be experienced in the present, and so can its aﬀordances. The now-adult might
see the wall from his or her grown-up perspective, and access other aﬀects, or
experiences. What the authors suggest is thus that going back to these experiences,
aﬀorded by such time-spaces, can also allow exploring and enriching these ambiva-
lences and contradictory feelings in new ways.
The second example regards the relations of adoptive children and to their
parents. Foster and adoptive parents in the UK are encouraged by placement
agencies to build ‘‘memory books’’ for the children, so that these can have material
to build up memories and establish a sense of continuity beyond multiple place-
ments. The authors show how much these albums, as well as objects or pictures in
children’s room, constitute the life-space of these children in their families, yet also
can unfold in various directions. Notably, adopted children can unfold these times-
spaces so as to incorporate past foster parents or biological parents as signiﬁcant to
them, for instance by adding their pictures in their rooms. Although these expose
adoptive parents to ambivalent feelings and experiences, the authors highlight here
the importance for adopted children of these deployment of time-spaces in various
distal experiences, which can, however, be more or less recognized, or silenced by
adoptive parents, often with the intention to protect the child.
The next example opens up the question of remembering at a collective level.
Here, the memories of survivors of the London bombings are explored. The
authors show the complex mutual constitution of private recollections and the
media, and the performative power of these memories once ﬁxated in public dis-
courses. Hence, they show how, for individuals having been for instance in the
metro in which a bomb exploded, reading about the events and seeing maps of the
tube allows to re-explore the time-space conﬁgurations of their experience – where I
was seated, who was next to me, how it smelled, what was the noise on my side.
They show how individual discourses, made public via the newspapers or other
media, were used by each person to make sense of their own experiences, yes also at
times orienting them in directions they refused – for instance, being seen as victims
seeking revenge. For these whose discourses had made public, Brown and Reavey
also show the diﬃculty of becoming again agents of their memories, and not
imprisoned by the collective version of that memory or their role in this remem-
bering. Finally, they demonstrate how these events, and their intensity, both pri-
vately and ampliﬁed by the public discourses and the media, became turning points
in the life of many – a point from which life cannot be read similarly again.
The weight of institution is even stronger in the next example, which concerns a
psychiatric prison ward. Brown and Reavey show how a total institutions’ policy
consisting in ‘‘ignoring’’ the inmates’ past, together with the heavy physical trans-
formations caused by chemical medication, aﬀect thse persons. The inmates are
trying to reestablish a sense of continuity and connect to their own past memories,
at times through their constrained bodies. Paradoxically, inmates are also very
aware of the fact that the time-space of the ward, that excludes their past and
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forces them to an immobile present, contains the expanded life-spaces of the care-
givers – trouble at home aﬀects their conduct toward them. The chapter interest-
ingly raises the question of the misbalance between these un/authorized expanded
time-spaces, and the ethical implication of such deprivation for the inmates.
In contrast, the last example concerns a memory museum in the Netherlands, in
which older people are exposed to rooms, daily objects and pieces of furniture
corresponding to these of their own past. Brown and Reavey show that these
arrangements of objects have the power to open and expand the present life-
space in a wide variety of directions, and people convoke many layers of experi-
ences, in which they have diﬀerent perspective – as a child using a glass bottle, as a
mother, or as a grandmother – thus revitalizing present experiences. Such obser-
vation underlines the role of materiality and all senses in deploying time-space in
older people, beyond narratives.
Hence, in these ﬁve cases, Brown and Reavey work with the idea that vital
memories are embodied and aﬀective conﬁgurations, partly distributed and
refracted through relational spaces and places, with topological properties. These
become relevant in the present when topological properties demand their unfold-
ing, thus expanding the present, revisiting the past and guiding futures. Yet, this
also implies that social dynamics are actively facilitating or constraining this expan-
sive work, and thus, shape a person’s present, past and future experiences.
From vital memories to theorizing human experience
in society
In their conclusive chapter, Brown and Reavy propose a series of schema to
describe or represent the various models involved. My only regret is that this
schematization is not oﬀered to start with and in support of the many case studies.
The task of constructing the common thread or model through the cases and their
variations through the chapters falls on the side of the reader. However, this open-
ing also allows me to come back to the authors propositions and highlight what I
see as main contributions to a sociocultural understanding of human development.
First, the understanding of memory proposed Brown and Reavey, grounded in a
wide diversity of theoretical sources, is very consonant with current approaches in
sociocultural psychology. In his work, Wagoner (2017) proposes re-readings of
Bartlett that show the work of remembering through time, shaped by emotions
and cultural means. De Saint-Laurent is elaborating a model of remembering along
the lifecourse which sees the memory act as relational, situated, mediated by sym-
bolic and material tools, both a means and a product of recalls, supported or
constrained in the settings of recall, and linked to dynamics of imagination – as
such, connecting proximal to distal experiences (de Saint-Laurent, 2017; de Saint-
Laurent & Zittoun, in press).
Second, the more general theoretical underlying model here needs to be high-
lighted. The authors indeed admit a deeply dynamic understanding of human lives
in society. They ground their proposition in a careful rereading of the work of
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Lewin; its relevance to current studies is worth highlighting. His proposition to
study a person’s life-space at some point in time and space is still highly relevant; as
few theories do, it allows indeed both to have a rich understanding of human
experience of time, and of the deep interrelation of the real and unreality. For
Lewin, indeed, count as part of the life-space any past or future, proximal or
distal experience that is meaningful and participates to a person’s experience in a
certain situation. A second point worth underlying is that of the topological under-
standing of human experience: it is conﬁgurations, or patterns of emotional experi-
ences that have stability through time, and that it is conﬁgurations, or patterns,
that can remain active in shaping experiences, or that can be reactivated, trans-
formed or vanish through time. Such conﬁgurations are at the same time psycho-
logical realities, and related to beings-in-the world, that is, with an emotional,
embodied, material quality. Now, how to combine life-worlds – as general evolving
ﬁelds – and speciﬁc conﬁgurations?
In our own work, reading both Lewin and Schuetz (Schuetz, 1944, 1945; Zittoun
& Gillespie, 2015c), we have proposed the notion of ‘‘sphere of experience’’ to go
beyond this tension. We have deﬁned these as stable conﬁgurations of situated
acting, with speciﬁc others, identity aspects, emotional qualities, intentions – that
is, conﬁguration of experiences. These can be recognized as they ‘‘feel the same’’ to
the person – and thus, as in the cases reported here, people might connect situations
or social setting which may be apparently diﬀerent or disjoint, but because they feel
‘‘the same’’, or demand the same action, or demand a certain posture or contain a
speciﬁc object – because, for any reason, a relation can be establish between an
experience and another one. Hence, a person has not one life-world or life-space
with diﬀerent zones; rather, we see the life-world of the person as continuous
reconﬁguration of spheres of experiences and of the relations between them. At
any moment in time, some come to the fore, and other needs to be revised, dis-
appear or created. At any moment, one sphere of experience is proximal and the
others are distal, if these have a relevance at that moment for the person. This
model allows us to conceptualize tensions, experiences of contradictions, but also,
learning, imagination and remembering, as dynamics of linking of spheres of
experiences, and transformations of these through speciﬁc processes (Gillespie &
Zittoun, 2015; Zittoun & Gillespie, 2015a, 2015b). Finally, such a model, developed
as theory of imagination, allows us to see remembering as an expansion of experi-
ence oriented towards the past – distal experiences thus entering in dialogue with
present proximal experiences (Zittoun & Gillespie, 2016). Such work is always
mediated through the use of various social and semiotic resources, is deeply embo-
died as it often takes place below or beyond language, and deeply aﬀective; thus,
imagining and remembering are always dynamics and mutually constitutive
(Zittoun et al., 2013). Brown and Reavey, however, allow us to emphasize the
relational and embodied nature of the spheres of experiences, and the institutional
constrains.
In eﬀect, third, the authors try to account for not only the person’s experiences,
but social and institutional guidance in that experience. It might be recalled here
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that Lewin (2000) tried to go beyond the problem of a purely idiosyncratic or sol-
ipsistic psychology by including the role of the social world ‘‘at the boundary’’ of the
person’s life-space- again, what count for him or her. However, in the light of the
data presented here, and from the evidences brought in cultural psychology, seeing
culture just ‘‘at the boundary’’ of self and the world is limiting. Rather, the mutual
constitution of social and material arrangements becomes part of the conﬁguration
of mind. In their case analyses, Brown and Reavey include elements of these social
dynamics, showing how that interpersonal recognition, social networks, the circu-
lation of knowledge through the media, material and spatial arrangements, and
institutions, guide and constrain – or more generally, participate to the making of
vital memories. Beyond that scope, how to theorize and integrate a full reading of
the social space and its guidance of mind and experience is, however, yet to be done.
It seems that sociocultural psychology (as well as other societal or social psychol-
ogies, see for instance Holzkamp, 2015) still is lacking a full articulation of these two
level of dynamics and their variations. We have proposed elsewhere to examine how
social situations propose positions, and artifacts that can be translated in certain
modes of semiotic guidance (Gillespie & Zittoun, 2013; Zittoun, 2011; Zittoun &
Gillespie, 2015a, 2015b). Yet, this is only a partial solution to a more general ques-
tion to which we don’t have fully satisfying solutions.
Finally, fourth, Brown and Reavey ground their work in a speciﬁc philosophical
tradition, ﬁnding its origin in Spinoza. Although Spinoza was also in the back-
ground of Vygotsky’s work, the implications of his propositions for current socio-
cultural psychology are often neglected, despite the careful reading of some critical
authors (Bronckart, 2008; Stenner & Brown, 2009; van der Veer, 1984). Here,
Brown and Reavey use it to ground their ethical concern and give an explicit
line to their own normative choices. One can only, if not share that particular
choice, be inspired by their responsible posture.
As a whole, thus, ‘‘Vital memory and aﬀect’’ is a refreshing, deep and inspiring
work, and one can only hope that it will inspire more dialogues between that line of
reﬂection and current developments in sociocultural psychology.
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